Disciplinas oferecidas conjuntamente:
JC007
JC020
JC006
JC010

Filosofia da Ciência


JC010 | Filosofia da Ciência
Docente: Prof. Dr. Silvio Seno Chibeni
Horário: Segunda-feira das 14h às 18h
Local: IFCH (sala a ser definida)


Semestres em que a disciplina foi oferecida: 2015 - 2º Semestre,

O curso apresenta e discute os principais conceitos e argumentos envolvidos na controvérsia contemporânea acerca do realismo científico, tese epistemológica segundo a qual a ciência visa a nos fornecer, com suas teorias, uma descrição ao menos aproximadamente verdadeira da realidade.

Bibliografia básica – (detalhes e complementações serão fornecidos oportunamente)
I. Artigos e livro de S. S. Chibeni:
Berkeley e o papel das hipóteses na filosofia natural. Scientiae Studia. v. 8, n. 3, p. 389-419, 2010.
Explanations in microphysics: A response to van Fraassen’s argument. Principia, 12(1): 2008, pp. 49–71.
Afirmando o conseqüente: Uma defesa do realismo científico (?!). Scientiae Studia 4 (2): 221-249, 2006.
A Humean analysis of scientific realism. Ensaios sobre Hume, Lívia Guimarães (org.), Belo Horizonte, Segrac Editora, 2005. Pp. 89-108
Quinton’s neglected argument for scientific realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 36 (2): 393-400, 2005.
Locke on the epistemological status of scientific laws. Principia, 9 (1-2): 19-41, 2005.
Realismo científico empirista? Principia, 1 (2): 255-69, 1997b.
Aspectos da Descrição Física da Realidade. CLE, Unicamp, 1997a.
A inferência abdutiva e o realismo científico. Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Série 3, 6 (1): 45-73, 1996.
Descartes e o realismo científico. Reflexão, n. 57, pp. 35-53, 1993.

II. Outras referências (das quais serão oportunamente escolhidas alguns textos para análise no curso):
BOYD, R. The current status of scientific realism. In: Leplin 1984, p. 4l-82.
CARRIER, M. What is wrong with the miracle argument? Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 22, 1, p. 23-36, 1991.
––––. What is right with the miracle argument: Establishing a taxonomy of natural kinds. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 24, 3, p. 391-409, 1993.
CARTWRIGHT, N. How the Laws of Physics Lie, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983.
CLARCKE, S. P. & LYONS, T. D. (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, Scientific Realism and Common Sense. (Australasian Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17.) Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
CHURCHLAND, P.M. & HOOKER, C.A. (eds.) Images of Science. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985.
CUSHING, J. T., DELANEY, C.F. & GUTTING, G. M. (eds.) Science and Reality. Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Essays in Honor of Ernan McMullin. Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
ELLIS, B. What Science Aims to Do. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 48-74.
ENNIS, R. H. “Enumerative induction and best explanation” (Comments and criticism). The Journal of Philosophy, 65 (18): 523-29, 1968.
FINE, A. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp. 83-107. (reimpresso em FINE 1986, cap. 7.)
––––. The Shaky Game. Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1986. (Caps. 6 a 9.)
––––. Unnatural attitudes: Realist and instrumentalist attachments to science. Mind, 45, 378, p. 149-79, 1986b.
GHINS, M. Putnam’s no-miracle argument: A critique. In: Clarke & Lyons, 2002, p. 121-138.
––––. Can Common Sense Realism be Extended to Theoretical Physics? Logic Journal of the IGPL (International Group for Philosophical Logic), 13, 1, p. 95-111, Jan. 2005. (http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/)
HACKING, I. Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
HARDIN, C. & ROSENBERG, A. In defense of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 53, p. 31-51, 1982.
HARMAN, G. Inference to the best explanation. The Philosophical Review, 74 (1): 88-95, 1965.
––––. Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 65 (18): 529-33, 1968.
HEMPEL, C. G. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966.
HOOKER, C.A. Surface Dazzle, Ghostly Depths: An Exposition and Critical Evaluation of van Fraassen’s Vindication of Empiricism against Realism. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 153-196.
LAUDAN, L. A confutation of convergent realism. In: Leplin 1984, p. 218-49. 1984a.
––––. Explaining the success of science: Beyond epistemic realism and relativism. In: Cushing et al. 1984, p. 83-105. 1984b.
––––. Progress and its Problems. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1977.
––––. Science and Values. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984c.
––––. Science and Relativism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.
––––. Beyond Positivism and Relativism, Oxford, Westview Press, 1996.
LAUDAN, L. & LEPLIN, J. Empirical equivalence and underdetermination. The Journal of Philsophy, 88, 9, p. 449-472, 1991.
LEPLIN, J. (ed.) Scientific Realism. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1984.
¾¾. A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
LEWIS, P. Why the pessimistic induction is a fallacy. Synthese, 129, p. 371-380, 2001.
LIPTON, P. Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd. ed., London, Routledge, 2004.
MAXWELL, G. The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. In: Feigl, H. & Maxwell, G. (eds.) Scientific Explanation, Space and Time. (M.S.P.S. vol. III.) Minneapolis, University of Minnessota Press, 1962. Pp. 3-27.
MEEHL, P. The miracle argument for realism: An important lesson to be learned by generalizing from Carrier’s counter-examples. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 23, 2, p. 267-282, 1992.
MUSGRAVE, A. Constuctive Empiricism versus Scientific Realism. The Philosophical Quarterly 32(128): 262-271, 1982.
––––. Realism versus Constructive Empiricism. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 197-221.
NAGEL, E. The Structure of Science. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
NIINILUOTO, I. Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
NORRIS, C. Ontology according to van Fraassen: Some problems with constructive empiricism. Metaphilosophy, 28, 3, p. 196-218, 1997.
POPPER, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations. 4.ed., revised. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972a.
PSILLOS, S. Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth, London and New York, Roudledge, 1999.
PUTNAM, H. What is mathematical truth. In: Mathematics, Matter and Method. (Philosophical Papers, v.1.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
––––. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
SALMON, W. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.
SMART, J. J. C. Between Science and Philosophy. New York, Ramdom House, 1968.
THAGARD, P. R. The best explanation for theory choice. The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (2): 76-92, 1978.
VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. The Scientific Image. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.
––––. To Save the Phenomena. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp. 250-259.
––––. Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 245-308.
––––. The Empirical Stance. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002.

 

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